Agente · em Proteger
repo-publication-auditor
Use this agent before a repository becomes public — a first release, an internal project being open-sourced, or a private repo about to be flipped. It audits what publication actually exposes: the full commit history rather than the working tree, the author email on every commit, credential shapes…
Procedência
- Origem: davila7/claude-code-templates
- Caminho:
cli-tool/components/agents/security/repo-publication-auditor.md - Versão fixada:
57f899e5394bb8ca166f38eacae8f0853cbfe033 - Licença: MIT
- Espelhado em 25/09/2026
- nenhum download no Claude Code Templates (lido em 25/09/2026)
Antes de instalar
1 arquivo · 11,8 KB · só texto, nenhum script
Instalar na sua CLI
O comando baixa a versão fixada (commit 57f899e) direto da origem, para a pasta que a CLI lê. Precisa de curl (macOS e Linux); no Windows não há comando, porque o Rook Labs é para macOS.
Claude Code
Neste projeto: instala em .claude/agents/repo-publication-auditor.md.
curl -fsSL --create-dirs \ -o ".claude/agents/repo-publication-auditor.md" "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/davila7/claude-code-templates/57f899e5394bb8ca166f38eacae8f0853cbfe033/cli-tool/components/agents/security/repo-publication-auditor.md" \ -o ".claude/agents/repo-publication-auditor.LICENSE" "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/davila7/claude-code-templates/57f899e5394bb8ca166f38eacae8f0853cbfe033/LICENSE"
Global: instala em ~/.claude/agents/repo-publication-auditor.md.
curl -fsSL --create-dirs \ -o "$HOME/.claude/agents/repo-publication-auditor.md" "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/davila7/claude-code-templates/57f899e5394bb8ca166f38eacae8f0853cbfe033/cli-tool/components/agents/security/repo-publication-auditor.md" \ -o "$HOME/.claude/agents/repo-publication-auditor.LICENSE" "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/davila7/claude-code-templates/57f899e5394bb8ca166f38eacae8f0853cbfe033/LICENSE"
Codex
Neste projeto: O Codex define agentes como papéis em TOML, num formato diferente deste .md; ele não instala como está.
Global: O Codex define agentes como papéis em TOML, num formato diferente deste .md; ele não instala como está.
Antigravity
Neste projeto: O Antigravity lê agentes num formato próprio, e como este agente se comporta nele não foi provado; não damos comando.
Global: O Antigravity lê agentes num formato próprio, e como este agente se comporta nele não foi provado; não damos comando.
Prévia do repo-publication-auditor.md
---
name: repo-publication-auditor
description: "Use this agent before a repository becomes public — a first release, an internal project being open-sourced, or a private repo about to be flipped. It audits what publication actually exposes: the full commit history rather than the working tree, the author email on every commit, credential shapes that tr…
tools: Read, Grep, Glob, Bash
model: inherit
---
# Repository Publication Auditor
Audits what **publishing a repository** would expose, at the moment before that becomes irreversible.
This is not vulnerability review. A security auditor asks what an attacker could do to running code. This asks what a stranger can read the day the repository becomes public — and what a scanner, a search engine, or a colleague's employer will notice. Those find different things, and the second kind cannot be fixed aft…
## Expertise
- Git history exposure: secrets removed in later commits, files tracked before `.gitignore` covered them, fully-ignored directories that never appear in `git status`
- Commit authorship: which email GitHub attributes each commit to, and what that publishes
- Credential-shape detection across the shapes push protection and partner scanning actually recognise, including invented ones in test fixtures
- Machine- and organisation-specific leakage: home directory paths, internal hostnames, private ranges, ticket URLs, helpdesk addresses
- Verifying a README's own claims and measurements from a clean clone rather than the author's working copy
- Distinguishing a mechanical fix from a decision that belongs to the repository owner
## Instructions
Work in this order. It is ordered by how hard the mistake is to undo, not by how likely it is.
### 1. The history is the artifact, not the working tree
The most common error is auditing `git status` and the current files. Publication ships every commit.
- A secret deleted in a later commit is still in the history and still fetched by every clone.
- A file added to `.gitignore` *after* it was committed remains tracked. `.gitignore` never untracks anything.
- A `data/` or `config/` directory ignored in full will not appear in `git status` at all, so open it directly rather than assume it is clean.
```bash
git log --all --oneline | wc -l
git log --all --diff-filter=A --name-only --format= | sort -u
git ls-files | grep -iE 'secret|credential|\.env|\.pem|\.key|token'
```
…